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Initially, Internet has evolved as a resource sharing model where resources are
identified by IP addresses. However, with rapid technological advancement,
resources/hardware has become cheap and thus, the need of sharing hardware
over Internet is reduced. Moreover, people are using Internet mainly for infor-
mation exchange and hence, Internet has gradually shifted from resource
sharing to information sharing model. To meet the recent growing demand
of information exchange, Content Centric Network (CCN) is envisaged as a
clean‐slate future network architecture which is specially destined for smooth
content distribution over Internet. In CCN, content is easily made available
using network caching mechanism which is misaligned with the existing busi-
ness policy of content providers/publishers in IP‐based Internet. Hence, the
transition from contemporary IP‐based Internet to CCN demands attention
for redesigning the business policy of the content publishers/providers. In this
paper, we have proposed efficient and secure communication protocols for flex-
ible CCN business model to protect the existing business policies of the content
publisher while maintaining the salient CCN features like in‐network content
caching and Interest packet aggregation. To enhance the efficiency and security,
the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used. The proposed ECC‐based
scheme is analyzed to show that it is resilient to relevant existing cryptographic
attacks. The performance analysis in terms of less computation and communi-
cation overheads and increased efficiency is given. Moreover, a formal security
verification of the proposed scheme is done using widely used AVISPA simula-
tor and BAN logic that shows our scheme is well secured.
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interest packet aggregation, mutual authentication, secure business model, session key negotiation1 | INTRODUCTION
The transition from conventional IP‐based Internet to the future Content Centric Network (CCN) paradigm requires
redesigning of the existing business policy of the Internet. Before going into the details of CCN business model, the basic
idea of current Internet, recent Internet usage scenario, basic issues of conventional IP‐based Internet, evolution of CCN
and need of a CCN business model are briefly discussed in the following subsections.© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/dac 1 of 26
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Contemporary IP‐based Internet, a host centric network architecture, was initially designed to share network hardware
resources where hardware/hosts are identified by IP addresses. Today, with rapid technological advancement, informa-
tion is becoming more important than hardware and Internet is mainly used for sharing/exchanging information.1
According to Cisco Visual Networking Index forecast, global IP traffic will nearly triple by 2020 to reach 194.4 EB
per month.1 Hence, the rate of information exchange is increasing day by day. Moreover, people value Internet for what
information they get rather than from where it is available. Therefore, to meet the ever increasing need of information
exchange, Content Centric Network (CCN) is envisaged as a clean‐slate future Internet architecture to leverage the ease
of information/content distribution.2-5 In CCN, content gets more importance than the host which provides the content.
Here, content is considered as an independently routable unit and is decoupled from its host address to decrease the
complexity of point to point content sharing. Moreover, content is uniquely identified by the name of the content over
the network and content packets are routed using its unique name. During the transmission, content packets can be
cached by the intermediate CCN routers to enhance the easy availability of content as well as to reduce the content
response time. In CCN, security is given separately on the piece of content rather than securing the container of the
content or the communication between two hosts. Hence, CCN is a future Internet architecture which facilitates easy
availability of content to match the growing demand of information exchange.1.2 | Basic issues
The salient CCN features such as in‐network content caching and Interest packet aggregation mechanisms enhance the
overall efficiency of CCN but at the same time disturb the fundamental business policy of the content provider/publisher
of the conventional IP‐based Internet. This is because the content publishers usually earn revenue from their potential con-
sumers through tracking and monetizing content usage. As CCN makes publisher's content available with the network
routers that leaves content publishers with unprecedented challenge for tracking content access. Hence, an efficient and
flexible CCN business model is required to protect the business interest of content publishers in this new CCN framework.1.3 | Our contribution
In this paper, we have proposed efficient and secure communication protocols for flexible CCN business model through
which the content publisher can track its potential consumers as well as their content usage. The proposed business model
not only ensures security of the financial transactions between the consumer and the publisher by using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) but also minimizes the computation and communication cost and enhances the efficiency of CCN.1.4 | Paper organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background study of the proposed work.
The fundamentals of ECC are given in section 3. In section 4 and section 5, proposed CCN architecture and proposed
CCN business model are presented respectively. The security analysis is given in section 6. In section 7, formal verifica-
tion and simulation using AVISPA is done. Section 8 presents the protocol analysis using BAN logic. The performance
analysis of the proposed scheme is given in section 9 and finally section 10 concludes the paper.2 | BACKGROUND STUDY
Initially CCN was envisaged as a new networking paradigm to leverage scalable content distribution with Interest based
content retrieval, name based routing, in‐network content caching and Interest packet aggregation as salient features.2-5
Generally, CCN has four types of network entities namely consumer, content provider, content publisher / publisher and
CCN routers. In addition, CCN uses two types of packets namely Interest packet, generated by consumer for sending
content request and Content packet, generated by publisher for sending the content. Later on, another type of CCN
packet, called manifest packet was introduced to communicate access control information.6 The work paradigm of all
the entities using mentioned packets is discussed now. Initially, consumer generates Interest for the respective content
he/she needs. The Interest is then forwarded by CCN routers towards the respective content provider/publisher.
ADHIKARI ET AL. 3 of 26Publisher collects the content from the respective content provider and publishes the content packet in the CCN. The
nearest router of the publisher then forwards the content packet to the consumer using reverse interest path. In
CCN, router performs name based routing similar to conventional IP‐based routing using longest prefix match mecha-
nism. However, unlike the conventional network router, CCN router optionally stores content in their limited buffer
called content store (CS) for future use. This phenomenon is known as in‐network content caching mechanism. Usually
CCN router follows popularity based content caching and acts accordingly as discussed now. After receiving an Interest
packet, CCN router initially searches the content name in its CS. If the content is available in CS, the router sends the
content to the consumer; otherwise it enlists the Interest name in its pending Interest table (PIT) and forwards the Interest
according to its forwarding information base (FIB). Moreover, if multiple Interest packets for the same content are received
from downstream by a CCN router, it forwards only the first Interest packet upstream towards the respective content pro-
vider/publisher and enlists all the Interest requests in its PIT. This phenomenon is called Interest packet aggregation. After
receiving the content from the publisher, the router accordingly forwards the content packet to all the consumers.Consid-
ering the research aspects of CCN, the existing research work so far mainly focuses on content naming,7 content caching
policy,8,9 content routing9 and content security.10 However, to be widely adopted by the Internet community, the develop-
ment of business model for CCN publisher is necessary and that is considered as one of the important research aspects to be
taken care of. For better understanding, the necessity of the CCN business model is discussed now.
In CCN, the in‐network content caching mechanism reduces the response time and enhances the efficiency and easy
availability of content whereas Interest packet aggregation reduces the network traffic. However, in both the cases the
content publisher becomes unaware about the several accesses of its content and as a result, it remains unacquainted
about the consumers' demands and unable to track those consumers.11 Therefore, considering the existing revenue
generation policy of IP‐based Internet, the CCN paradigm leaves content publishers with unprecedented challenge in
terms of revenue generation. Hence, to leverage the benefits of CCN as well as to restore the realistic business policy
of content publishers, we have explored a content provisioning mechanism or business model for CCN. To design secure
communication protocols for a flexible CCN business model, it is important to ensure that only the authenticated
consumers can access the content of the respective publisher. Moreover, the communication between the consumer and
the publisher is usually carried over an insecure channel where authentication is required to ensure privacy and integrity.
Hence, a two party mutual authentication between the consumer and the publisher is required where the publisher allows
only an authenticated consumer to access its content though the content may be available in network router's cache.
To understand the state‐of‐the‐art authentication protocols and develop an efficient and secure mutual authentica-
tion protocol for CCN business model, we have studied several papers on authentication which are briefly discussed
here. In 1981, Lamport12 proposed password based authentication scheme for remote user/server but the scheme is
found vulnerable to replay attack.13 Thereafter, multiple improved authentication and session key negotiation protocols
using different cryptosystems were proposed in the timeline. Few researchers have proposed bilinear pairing based
authentication schemes14-16 but it is already known that bilinear pairing has comparable higher computation overhead
than ECC based point multiplication operation.17-19 In 2011, Kalra and Sood20 have performed a detailed survey on ECC
based protocols and mentioned that ECC turns out to be a most efficient and lightweight security measure for authen-
tication between resource constrained client and server. Further, it is found that ECC based authentication protocols for
smart devices have several limitations. For example, Wu et al...21 have ensured user authentication but the scheme is
not resilient to server impersonation attack.22 Further, Abicher et al.23 and Tian et al.24 have used public key certificates
for mutual authentication that incurs additional overhead for maintaining certificates. Moreover, the ECC‐based
authentication schemes proposed by Kalra et al22 and Qi et al.25 require secure channel in registration phase that incurs
additional overheads for the establishment of secure channel. In recent time, many researchers proposed bio‐metric
based26-28 and smartcard based28-33 authentication schemes to provide higher security and robustness but due to the
higher maintenance cost of these technologies and security weaknesses, they are not widely accepted as briefly
discussed now. In 2014, Chen et al.31 proposed a smart card based password authentication scheme and claims that
the scheme can resist various malicious attacks. However, Jiang et al.32 found that the scheme proposed by Chen
et al.31 is vulnerable to off‐line password guessing attack and accordingly proposed an improved smartcard based
authentication scheme. Moreover, due to use of modular exponentiation operations, both the schemes31,32 have high
computation overhead. Later, in 2015, Karuppiah et al.33 also proposed a novel password and smartcard based remote
mutual authentication scheme but due to the use of smartcard, their scheme incurs high computation cost. In 2016,
Kumar et al.34 proposed an improved password and smartcard based remote user authentication scheme which found
to be susceptible to replay and session key disclosure attack.35 Recently, in 2017, Li et al.36 proposed an ECC and bio-
metric based authentication scheme for IoT environment but due to the use of biometric, the scheme becomes
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due to the use of bilinear pairing, the scheme incurs high computation overhead. In 2018, Park et al.38 found few
vulnerabilities such as impersonation attack in Qi et al.’s25 scheme and proposed an improved smartcard based two
party authentication and key exchange protocol in mobile environment but their scheme incurs high cost of maintain-
ing smart card and they need a secure channel for registration phase. Hence, due to lack of cost‐effective but efficient
and secure authentication scheme, the development of the same suitable for CCN business model is needed.
Therefore, our objective is to design secure communication protocols for flexible CCN business model that provides
consumer registration, mutual authentication, session key negotiation and consumer's password change option in an
efficient but cost effective manner. Our major motivation is to design a widely acceptable and cost effective security
solution for CCN business model with the salient CCN features like in‐network content caching and Interest packet
aggregation.3 | PRELIMINARIES OF ECC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)39-42 is a state‐of‐the‐art lightweight cryptosystem as it uses smaller key size than
other contemporary cryptosystems such as RSA. In addition, ECC uses additive finite group rather than multiplicative
group used by RSA. Therefore, additive finite group operations like point addition and point multiplication can be per-
formed more efficiently in ECC over the modular exponentiation operation performed in RSA. Further, ECC attains
comparable level of security using only 160‐bits key whereas RSA requires 1024‐bits key for same level of security.
Moreover, as ECC based Discrete Logarithmic Problem (ECDLP) does not have any polynomial time algorithm; it is very
hard to compromise security in ECC.43-46 Hence, due to its higher efficiency and security strength, ECC is widely used
by many researchers and network security professionals. Now, a brief overview on ECC is given here.41,42
Let an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field F p, denoted as E/Fp, is defined by the following elliptic curve
equation:
y2 mod p ¼ x3 þ ax þ b  mod p (1)
Where p is a prime number; x, y, a, b ϵ Fp and (4a
3 + 27 b2) mod p ≠ 0. This Equation (1) uses additive elliptic curve
group defined as Gp = {(x, y): x, y ∈Fp and (x, y) ϵ E/Fp} U {O}, where point O is called point of infinity. Point of infinity is
the identity element of the additive elliptic curve group, used in ECC such that P+ O = P where P is a point on elliptic
curve defined by Equation (1). Let P and Q be two points on Equation (1) and Q = –P, then P + Q = P – P = O, where it
is assumed that the line joining P and –P intersects Equation (1) at point O. As the Equation (1) uses additive finite ellip-
tic curve group, it supports following operations as discussed below.39-42
• Scalar point multiplication: A scalar t can be multiplied with an elliptic curve point P on Equation (1). It is
defined as tP=P + P+ … + P (t times), where t ∈R Z*p.
• Point addition: Addition of two points P and Q on Equation (1) is defined as P + Q = R where P ≠ Q. Here, with
respect to x‐axis, R is the reflection of intersection point (‐R), between the line joining P, Q and Equation (1).
• Point doubling: Adding a point with itself is known as point doubling. Let 2P=P + P = Q, then with respect to
x‐axis, Q is the reflection of intersection point (–Q), between the tangent line at point P and Equation (1).
In addition to ECDLP, Elliptic Curve Factorization Problem (ECFP), Computational Diffie‐Hellman Problem (CDHP)
and Decisional Diffie‐Hellman Problem (DDHP) also do not have any polynomial time algorithm47-49 and that makes
ECC based security solutions very hard to compromise. Therefore, these security hardnesses, higher efficiency, smaller
key size, less computation, communication and storage cost of ECC have motivated us to use ECC based security solu-
tion for designing the proposed business model for CCN.4 | PROPOSED CCN ARCHITECTURE
As mentioned in the literature,2-10 in CCN, publisher works as the interface of the actual content provider which stores/
generates the content. Multiple content providers may operate under one publisher. After collecting the content from a
content provider, the publisher performs the content encryption, packetization and content dissemination operations.
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is distinct for every content published by a publisher. When content is first time published, the publisher randomly gen-
erates a content key, encrypts the content using it and stores it in a database against the respective content name. For
accessing the content, a consumer needs to decrypt the content and invariably needs the content key from the publisher.
During the transmission, the encrypted content may be optionally cached by any intermediate CCN routers. Usually,
CCN routers use popularity based content caching mechanism. In such mechanism, the router measures the popularity
of a content by considering the number of Interest packet enlisted in its PIT, for a particular content. So, the content
may be available in the CCN router's cache, but to access the content the consumer needs to get the content key from
the respective publisher. The publisher uses encryption to send the content key in a secure way to the respective
consumer. In our scheme, the content key is never cached by the CCN routers. In case, we enable CCN routers to cache
the content key, the router has to do the content key encryption separately for each consumer. In such circumstance,
efficiency will increase along with router's overhead but the security will significantly decrease. Now, a brief workflow
of proposed CCN architecture is discussed below:
In the proposed CCN architecture, initially, a consumer requests for content by sending Interest packet. The Interest
is then forwarded by the CCN routers and finally reaches the respective content publisher. The publisher collects the
requested content from the respective content provider. After receiving the content from the content provider, the pub-
lisher encrypts it with a distinct secret content key. The publisher also encrypts the secret content key with another
shared secret key which is negotiated between the publisher and the respective consumer. Then, the publisher
packetizes both the encrypted content and encrypted content key and publishes in CCN. Finally, the encrypted content
and encrypted content key are forwarded by the CCN routers using reverse Interest path and sent to the respective con-
sumer. During transmission, CCN intermediate routers optionally store the encrypted content part in their CS. Later, if
the same content is requested by any other consumer, the router finds the content in its CS and sends a request for
content key to the respective publisher who originally publishes the particular content. After receiving the content
key request from the router, the publisher sends only the encrypted content key to the requesting router who holds
the content. Then the router combines both the encrypted content and encrypted content key together and sends to
the consumer. The basic workflow of the proposed CCN architecture is depicted in Figure 1 for better understanding.
In the proposed scheme, we use three types of packets namely Interest packet for sending content request, Content
packet for sending content and Manifest packet for sending metadata of the communication. In this scheme, two types
of Interest packet are used namely, InterestC and InterestKC . InterestC is generated by the consumer for sending content
request and InterestKC is generated by the intermediate CCN router which has the requested content in its CS and used
for sending content key request to the publisher. Manifest packet is generally used for decoupling the content from its
metadata such as access control specification, payload, etc. We use Manifest packet to exchange the access control spec-
ification such as algorithms, hash function, cryptographic parameters, acknowledgement etc. between the consumer
and the publisher. Here, specifically, types of Manifest are used to send registration request (ManifestR), login request
(ManifestL), acknowledgement (ManifestAckP or ManifestAckC), password change request (ManifestP) and secret content
key (ManifestKC ). However, Manifest packets are never cached by the CCN routers. A general format of different packet
structures used in the proposed scheme is given in Figure 2.FIGURE 1 Proposed workflow of CCN architecture
FIGURE 2 General format of different
CCN packet structures
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In CCN, the available/requested content is divided in two categories namely general content and exclusive content.
General content is available free of cost but for accessing the exclusive content, the consumer has to pay the subscrip-
tion fee to the publisher. In the proposed scheme, publisher maintains two databases namely CCN content database and
CCN consumer registration database to store content details and consumer details respectively. The structures of these
two databases are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively.
The CCN content database stores content name, content type, secret content key generated by the publisher, content
provider's name, popularity‐based counter (PCT) and other related data. Generally, content providers periodically
advertise their content name and publisher enlists the content name with the content provider in the content
database. The ‘content type’ attribute in CCN content database takes any of the two values namely general content
and exclusive content.
On the other hand, CCN consumer registration database stores consumer's ID, subscription type, consumer's secret
password, hit‐based counter (HCT) and other related information such as content request history etc. The ‘subscription
type’ attribute in CCN consumer registration database may take values as: 0 – for no subscription, 1‐ for pay per content,
2 – for monthly subscription, 3 – for yearly subscription and 4 – for hit based subscription. In case of a consumer who
doesn't subscribe to the publisher, his/her subscription type is 0 and the consumer's secret password attribute is null.
With the subscription type 0, the consumer can only access general content. In case of a consumer who accesses any
general content, the HCT counter of the CCN consumer registration database is not updated i.e. the HCT counter is
updated only when any exclusive content is successfully delivered to the respective consumer. In case of 1, 2 and 3
subscription type, the HCT counter increases with each content access but in case of subscription type 4, HCT takes
a maximum value as specified and decreases with each content access. Moreover, for 2 and 3 subscription type, the
subscription has to be renewed after the end of the month and year respectively but in case of hit based subscription,
it has to renew after HCT becomes zero. The ‘content request history’ attribute of the CCN consumer registration
database stores the pattern of content usage of the particular consumer that can be further used to predict the future
request or to send recommendations for other content.
Now a brief workflow of the proposed business model is discussed here. In our scheme, when an Interest for content
request comes to a content provider, it is attended by the interface publisher. The publisher searches the content name
in its CCN content database and follows any of the cases discussed below.
Case 1: If the requested content is a general type content i.e. available free of cost, then the publisher follows model‐1,
discussed in subsection 5.1, for general content provisioning. In brief, the publisher collects the respective content
from the content provider listed in its CCN content database. If the content is already requested previously, then
the secret content key KC for the respective content is stored in the CCN content database. If the content is requestedFIGURE 3 CCN content database
FIGURE 4 CCN consumer registration
database
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After getting KC, the publisher encrypts the content using KC, packetizes the encrypted content and sends to the
consumer. The publisher also sends the KC to the respective consumer in a secure way. The publisher also updates
the CCN consumer registration database with the content request history of the consumer that may be used in future
for analyzing the demand or for recommending another content.
Case 2: On the other hand, if the content is an exclusive content i.e. paid content, then the publisher searches the
CCN consumer registration database for the particular consumer ID. If the consumer is a registered consumer, then
he/she has a subscription type and the secret password, stored in the CCN consumer registration database. Initially,
the consumer sends a login request with the Interest for the particular content and the publisher follows model‐2,
discussed in subsection 5.2, for exclusive content provisioning. After receiving the request, the publisher authenti-
cates the consumer and after successful authentication, the publisher follows the same procedure as in case 1 and
accordingly delivers the content to the consumer. After successful content delivery, the publisher updates the
CCN consumer registration database and specially, the HCT counter. However, if it is found that the login request
is not attached with the Interest, then the publisher simply rejects the content request. Otherwise, if the content
request is for exclusive content and the consumer is not a registered consumer, then the publisher sends a response
Manifest requesting the consumer to subscribe for the exclusive content.
Thus, the publisher performs all the required work for content delivery and revenue generation. More importantly,
the publisher handles the business policy of the content providers and keeps track of the potential consumers who
access their content. The publisher also tracks the amount of content usage and usage pattern of the consumers.TABLE 1 Notations and their meaning
Symbols Meaning
P Publisher
CM Consumer
EX/DX Encryption/decryption using secret key X
CAX Public key certificate of X
KC Secret content key for encrypting content C
KCM Secret key between publisher and consumer
h(_) A secure one‐way hash function such as SHA‐1
IDP Identity of publisher
IDCM Identity of consumer
|| Concatenation
F p A finite field over prime p
Ep(a, b) An elliptic curve over Fp
G Generator of the cyclic group on Ep(a, b) with order n where G(x, y) ∈ Z*p
(rp, PUp) Private/public key pair of publisher wherePUp = rp. G
(rCM, PUCM) Private/public key pair of consumer wherePUCM = rCM. G
InterestC Interest (content request) from consumer
InterestKC Interest (content key request) from CCN router
ManifestAckP Manifest for acknowledgement from publisher
ManifestAckC Manifest for acknowledgement from consumer
ManifestR Manifest for registration request
ManifestL Manifest for login request
ManifestP Manifest for password change request
ManifestKc Manifest for encrypted secret content key
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publisher tracks its potential consumers, their content usage pattern and amout of content usage by a hit based content
provisioning method and thereby earns revenue from consumers. In addition, the publisher also monitors the popular-
ity of its content and monetize accordingly. As stated earlier, publisher has two types of business provisions: case 1 and
case 2 which are presented in detail as model‐1 and model‐2 respectively in the following subsections where the
following notations, given in Table 1, are used. The publisher can follow both the models for general as well as exclusive
content provisioning simultaneously and that gives business flexibility in the proposed scheme. Moreover, in both the
business models, a popularity‐based counter PCT is used to count the hits for a particular content and a hit‐based
counter HCT is used to count the hits of a particular consumer. PCT and HCT are maintained to track the popularity
of a content and the number of the particular consumer's login respectively.5.1 | Model – 1
In this subsection, the main focus is on the general / free of cost content provisioning where the content is available free
of cost and publisher tracks their potential consumers and their active content usage pattern. Although, in this model
the publisher doesn't earn revenue directly from the content usage but makes profit by using the CCN content database
and CCN consumer registration database for further business analytics such as future market prediction, demand
analysis etc. The publisher stores the consumer's identity, their usage pattern/content request history etc. in the CCN
consumer registration database through which the publisher can analyze the future content demand as well as can send
future content recommendations. The CCN consumer registration database can also be used for advertisements etc.
according to the consumers' usage pattern to earn revenue from the advertisers. The databases can also be used for
sending recommendations for similar types of exclusive contents in which the consumer may be interested and thereby
increasing the scope of business provisions for the publisher. Moreover, the PCT counter of the CCN content database
may be used to measure the popularity of a particular content that helps to decide the cost of the respective content for
conversion to exclusive content. The proposed model‐1 for general content provisioning is depicted in Figure 5 and
step‐wise discussed below where X → Y : M means the sender X sends message M to the receiver Y.
Step 1. Consumer → Publisher: {IDCM,CACM, InterestC}FIGURE 5 Model ‐ 1 for general
content provisioning
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CACM.
Step 2. Publisher → Consumer: IDP;ContentC;ManifestKC
 
After receiving the content request, the publisher searches content name in the CCN content database. If the content
is a general type content i.e. available free of cost, the publisher follows model‐1. Initially, the publisher validates CACM
and if validated, retrieves IDCM from it and checks whether received IDCM = retrieved IDCM? If yes, retrieves PUCM from
CACM. After that, the publisher collects the requested content C from the respective content provider and subsequently
encrypts the content using the corresponding secret content key KC. The publisher also generates ContentC packet con-
taining the encrypted content EKC Cð Þ. Now the publisher calculates KCM, the shared secret between the publisher and
the consumer, as: X = rP.PUCM = (XX, XY) where KCM = XX. After deriving KCM, the publisher encrypts KC using KCM as:
EKCM KCð Þ and generates ManifestKC packet containing the encrypted content key. The publisher stores/updates the
respective consumer's identity IDCM in its CCN consumer registration database along with its content request history
and other related details. The publisher also updates the PCT counter of the requested content in the CCN content
database. Finally, the publisher sends its identity IDP, content packet ContentC and Manifest packet ManifestKC which
contains the secret content key, to the respective consumer.
It is to be noted that during transmission, the ContentC packet may be cached by the intermediate CCN routers.
Hence, if next time a similar content request comes to the router who previously cached the content, the router sends
the response ContentC packet to the respective consumer. In addition, the router generates an content key request
InterestKC from the original InterestC and sends to the publisher who generates the content. After receiving the content
key request InterestKC , the publisher searches its CCN content database and gets the corresponding secret content key
KC. Then the publisher follows previously mentioned procedure given in Figure 5 and sends only ManifestKC
packet along with IDP to the respective router (who sends InterestKC ) as: IDP;ManifestKC
 
in step 2. After receiving
the ManifestKC , the respective router combines the ManifestKC with the ContentC available in its CS and sends to the
respective consumer as stated earlier. Thus, though the consumer gets the required content from the nearest CCN
router's CS, the content key, which is required to decrypt the content, is received only from the original publisher that
makes the publisher able to track the use of content by the consumer.5.2 | Model – 2
In this subsection, the main focus is to keep provision for accessing the exclusive/paid content where publisher earns
revenue by delivering exclusive content to its consumers on the basis of respective paid subscription types. Initially, a
consumer's registration procedure is performed by the publisher before the delivery of any content / content key.
After verifying all the required credentials, the publisher registers a consumer under any of the subscription types
(1, 2, 3 and 4) with the payment of appropriate charges, if any, as mentioned in 3rd paragraph of section 5. After
the successful registration, the consumer gets a secret password PWCM from the publisher that is stored in the CCN
consumer registration database along with consumer's identity IDCM, subscription type and other related details as
shown in Figure 4.
In case of monthly (subscription type – 2) or yearly (subscription type – 3) or hit based subscription (subscription
type – 4), the registration is successfully completed against certain amount of payment and the consumer gets a secret
password PWCM. On the other hand, in pay per content policy (subscription type – 1), the consumer has to initially reg-
ister to get the secret password PWCM but has to pay at the time of login to the publisher for accessing exclusive content.
For hit based subscription (subscription type – 4), the number of hit (content access) is monitored by updating HCT
counter in the CCN consumer registration database as stated in 3rd paragraph of section 5. In this case, a maximum
number of hit (HCT value) is specified by the respective publisher that decreases with each content access. Finally,
when the HCT counter decreases to zero, the consumer's password becomes invalid i.e. the subscription ends. On the
other hand, for monthly or yearly subscription (subscription type – 2 or 3), the consumer's secret password becomes
invalid i.e. the subscription ends after the end of the month or year.
Note that, when a consumer searches a content in the application layer, he/she may get several options of availabil-
ity by different content publishers. If the required content is an exclusive type content, the consumer sends Interest
request InterestC to the publisher with whom the consumer has valid registration. In case, the required content is not
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from another publisher by pay per content basis (subscription type – 1).
Each time when a consumer wants to access an exclusive content with valid registration; he/she has to send an
authentication request along with the InterestC to the respective publisher. The registered consumer's content request
is processed by the publisher with higher priority than the unregistered consumer's request. The consumer's authenti-
cation request is validated by the publisher using the consumer's secret password PWCM. This validation procedure
follows the proposed ECC‐based mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol as depicted in Figure 7. To
provide sufficient security, the model‐2 includes a remote mutual authentication scheme which is divided into three fol-
lowing sub‐sections namely – (1) ECC‐based consumer registration protocol, (2) ECC‐based mutual authentication and
session key negotiation protocol and (3) ECC‐based consumer's password change protocol with step‐wise descriptions
where X → Y : M means the sender X sends message M to the receiver Y.5.2.1 | ECC‐based consumer registration protocol
Any consumer who wants to access exclusive content has to register to the respective publisher. The registration proce-
dure is shown in Figure 6 and described below.
Step 1. Consumer → Publisher: {IDCM ; CACM ; EKCM IDCM‖n1ð Þ; ManifestR}
Initially, the consumer retrieves the public key PUP of the publisher against IDP from the certificate authority (CA).
Now the consumer calculates KCM, a contributory shared secret key between the consumer and the respective publisher
as: X = rCM. PUP = (XX,XY) where KCM = XX. Then, the consumer generates a random nonce n1, concatenates it with
identity IDCM and encrypts the concatenated message using KCM. The consumer also generates a registration request
ManifestR which contains the payment details in case of monthly, yearly and hit based subscription as shown in
Figure 2, (D). Finally, the consumer sends the ManifestR to the publisher along with its identity IDCM, public key certif-
icate CACM and EKCM IDCM‖n1ð Þ.
Step 2. Publisher → Consumer: IDP;EKCM PWCMð Þ; h PWCM‖n1ð Þ;ManifestAckPf gFIGURE 6 ECC‐based consumer registration protocol
ADHIKARI ET AL. 11 of 26After receiving the registration request, the publisher validates CACM and if validated retrieves IDCM from it. Checks
received IDCM = retrieved IDCM? If yes, retrieves PUCM from CACM and calculates KCM, the same shared secret between
the consumer and the publisher as: X = rP.PUCM = (XX, XY) where KCM = XX. Then, the publisher decrypts the
encrypted part as: DKCM EKCM IDCM‖n1ð Þð Þ ¼ IDCM‖n1 and checks decrypted IDCM = received IDCM? If yes, the publisher
generates a random password PWCM ∈ Z*p and stores IDCM alongwith the consumer's secret password PWCM in its
CCN consumer registration database. Now, the publisher generates aManifestAckP, the acknowledgement of the comple-
tion of registration. The publisher also concatenates the received nonce n1 with PWCM and makes a hash digest of the
concatenated message as: h (PWCM||n1). Finally, the publisher encrypts PWCM with KCM as: EKCM PWCMð Þ and sends to
the consumer along with its identity IDP, the hash digest and ManifestAckP.
After receiving, the consumer decrypts the encrypted password and gets the password PWCM as DKCM EKCM PWCMð Þð Þ
= PWCM. Now, the consumer checks h (received PWCM||sent n1) = received h (PWCM||n1)? If yes, the consumer stores the
secret password PWCM through which the registered consumer can authenticate himself/herself to the publisher during
login phase.5.2.2 | ECC‐based mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol
In order to access any exclusive content of the publisher, a registered consumer has to login to the publisher using his/
her login pair (IDCM, PWCM). The step‐wise login procedure is shown in Figure 7 and described below.FIGURE 7 ECC‐based mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol
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Initially, the consumer enters his/her secret password PWCM and accordingly a secret key P is generated as: P = PHCT.
G = (PX, PY) where, PHCT = PWCM + HCT. Here, as stated earlier, HCT is a hit‐based counter in the CCN consumer
registration database which counts the number of exclusive content access by the respective consumer. In case of
monthly, yearly and pay per content subscription, HCT initially starts from 1 and after each successful receiving of
an exclusive content it is increased by 1. In case of hit based subscription, HCT starts from a fixed number, decided
by the publisher and after each successful receiving of an exclusive content it is decreased by 1. So, the maximum num-
ber of login in one particular subscription can be restricted and monitored by both the consumer and publisher. Now,
the consumer records current time stamp TS1, concatenates it with IDCM, encrypts the concatenated message using PX,
the x‐coordinate of the calculated secret key P, as: EPX IDCM‖TS1ð Þ. Finally, the consumer sends his identity IDCM, time
stamp TS1, the encrypted message EPX IDCM‖TS1ð Þ and login request ManifestL along with the exclusive content request
InterestC to the publisher. In case of pay per content subscription, ManifestL contains the payment details of the partic-
ular exclusive content.
Step 2. Publisher → Consumer: IDP;TS2;EPX KPP‖TS1ð Þ;ManifestAckPf g
After receiving the login request from the consumer in time T, the publisher initially checks |TS1 − T| < ΔT? If yes,
checks whether IDCM is a registered consumer i.e. the IDCM is present in the CCN consumer registration database? If
yes, the publisher retrieves PWCM from CCN consumer registration database and calculates the secret key P, using
corresponding consumer's secret password PWCM as: P = PHCT. G = (PX, PY) where, PHCT = PWCM + HCT. Now, the
publisher uses PX, the x‐coordinate of the calculated secret key P, to decrypt the received encrypted message as:
DPX EPX IDCM‖TS1ð Þð Þ and gets IDCM and TS1. Then, the publisher checks received IDCM = decrypted IDCM and received
TS1 = decrypted TS1? If yes, the consumer is authenticated. Then, the publisher selects a random i
th HCT session secret
psi ∈ Z
*
p and accordingly calculates KPP = psi. P; concatenates KPP with the received time stamp TS1 and encrypts the
concatenated message using PX as EPX KPP‖TS1ð Þ. Finally, the publisher records the current time stamp TS2 and sends to
the consumer along with the identity IDP, encrypted key part EPX KPP‖TS1ð Þ and ManifestAckP, the acknowledgement of
login, to the consumer.
Step 3. Consumer → Publisher: IDCM ; EPX KPC∣ TS2j Þ; ManifestAckCð gfFIGURE 8 ECC‐based consumer's
password change protocol
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decrypts the encrypted key part using previously calculated secret key PX as: DPX EPX KPP‖TS1ð Þð Þ =KPP‖TS1and gets
KPP and TS1. Now, the consumer checks received TS1 = sent TS1? If yes, the publisher is authenticated and thus, the
mutual authentication is completed. Now, the consumer selects a random ith HCT session secret csi ∈ Z*p. The consumer
also calculates its key part KPC = csi. P; concatenates KPC with the received time stamp TS2 and encrypts the
concatenated message using PX as EPX KPC‖TS2ð Þ. Then, the consumer calculates the contributory shared session key
SK = csi. KPP=csi. psi. P = csi. psi. PHCT. G =(SKX, SKY) and the SKX will be kept secret and used for secure transmission
of the exculsive content. Finally, the consumer sends the encrypted key part along with the identity IDCM and
ManifestAckC, the acknowledgement of receiving publisher's key part, to the publisher for negotiating the contributory
shared session key SKX.
After receiving the consumer's key part, the publisher decrypts it using PX as: DPX EPX KPC‖TS2ð Þð Þ =KPC‖TS2 and
gets the consumer's key part KPC and time stamp TS2. Now, the publisher checks received TS2 = sent TS2? If yes, the
publisher calculates the session key SK = psi. KPC=psi. csi. P = psi. csi. PHCT. G =(SKX, SKY) i.e. same SKX is generated
and will be used for secure transmission of the exculsive content. Once SK is calculated by both the consumer and the
publisher, the transfer of all the content including the secret content key KC is symmetrically encrypted/decrypted using
SKX of the session key SK.5.2.3 | ECC‐based Consumer's password change protocol
A registered consumer's password must be changed periodically to prevent any password guessing attack that increases
the security strength of the proposed scheme. The step‐wise password change procedure is shown in Figure 8 and
described below.
Step 1. Consumer → Publisher: IDCM ;TS3;EKX PWCM‖PW
′
CM‖TS3
 
;ManifestP
 
Initially, the consumer generates a ManifestP as given in Figure 2 for sending password change request to the
publisher. Now, the consumer randomly selects a new password PW ′CM , calculates a secret key KX using the con-
sumer's old password PWCM as: K=PWCM.G = (KX, KY), concatenates the old password PWCM with the new password
PW ′CM and current timestamp TS3, encrypts the concatenated message using KX and finally sends its identity IDCM,
timestamp TS3 and encrypted message EKX PWCM‖PW
′
CM‖TS3
 
along with the ManifestP to the publisher as a pass-
word change request.
Step 2. Publisher → Consumer: IDP;EKX TS3ð Þ;ManifestAckPf g
The publisher receives the password change request in time T and checks |TS3 − T| < ΔT? If yes, the publisher checks
whether the consumer's IDCM is present in the CCN consumer registration database? If so, the publisher retrieves PWCM
from the database and calculates the secret key KX as: K=PWCM.G = (KX, KY). Now, the publisher decrypts the received
encrypted message using KX as:DKX EKX PWCM‖PW
′
CM‖TS3
   ¼ PWCM‖PW ′CM‖TS3
 
and gets the consumers' old pass-
word, new password and the timestamp TS3. Then, the publisher checks decrypted PWCM = stored PWCM and decrypted
TS3 = received TS3? If both are yes, the publisher updates the consumer's old password PWCM with new password PW ′CM
in the CCN consumer registration database and finally sends the ManifestAckP, the acknowledgement of the password
change, to the consumer along with EKX TS3ð Þ, the encrypted received TS3 using KX.
After receiving the ManifestAckP from the publisher, the consumer initially decrypts the encrypted message as:
DKX EKX TS3ð Þð Þ ¼ TS3 and checks decrypted TS3 = sent TS3? If yes, the consumer is ensured about the updatation of
its password to PW ′CM .6 | SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, an in‐depth security analysis of all the proposed protocols is done to show that all of them are well
secured against relevant cryptographic attacks.
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Confidentiality is one of the major concerns for any network security protocol where the data communication must
remain secret between the sender and the receiver. As the medium of communication is an insecure channel, an
intruder can access any information traveling between the consumer and the publisher. Hence, in the model‐1 of the
proposed scheme, the content is encrypted using secret content key KC and KC is sent after encryption using another
secret key KCM. Moreover, in the proposed ECC‐based mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol,
all the sensitive information such as consumer's key part KPC and publisher's key part KPP are encrypted before trans-
mission. Similarly, in the proposed ECC‐based consumer's password change protocol, consumer's old password PWCM
and new password PW ′CM are also encrypted using secret password. Therefore, the confidentiality of the shared data
is preserved in our scheme.6.2 | Mutual authentication
Mutual authentication is an important network security parameter where sender and the receiver authenticate each
other. In the step 1 of the model‐1 of the proposed protocol, the publisher validates the consumer's public key certif-
icate CACM to ensure that the consumer is genuine. On the other hand, the consumer validates the authenticity of
the publisher from CA. Moreover, the content key KC is encrypted by the publisher using a contributory shared secret
key KCM which can be negotiated only by the respective consumer and the publisher. In the proposed ECC‐based
mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol, initially, the consumer sends encrypted IDCM and TS1
using secret key PX as: EPX IDCM‖TS1ð Þ. The secret key PX is calculated as: P = PHCT. G = (PX, PY) where,
PHCT = PWCM + HCT. Here, PX is calculated using consumer's secret password PWCM which is known to the respec-
tive consumer and the publisher. Moreover, hit‐based counter HCT is counted by the respective consumer and
publisher. Hence, PX is a secret between the consumer and the publisher. After receiving EPX IDCM‖TS1ð Þ from step
1, the publisher decrypts it using its own PX. Then the publisher checks decrypted IDCM = received IDCM and
decrypted TS1 = received TS1? If yes, consumer is authenticated. On the other hand, the publisher encrypts the
concatenated key part KPP and received TS1 using PX and sends to the consumer in step 2. After receiving the
encrypted key part from publisher, the consumer decrypts it using his own PX and gets the key part KPP and TS1.
The consumer checks received TS1 = sent TS1? If yes, then the publisher is authenticated. Thus, both the publisher
and consumer authenticate each other.
Similarly, in the proposed ECC‐based consumer's password change protocol, the communication between the
consumer and the publisher is encrypted using secret key KX which is calculated as: K=PWCM.G = (KX, KY). As, PWCM
is a secret between the consumer and the publisher, if any mismatch found by any party, the authentication process is
terminated. Hence, in both of these two proposed protocols, mutual authentication between the consumer and the
publisher is ensured.6.3 | Replay attack resilience / information freshness
Replay attack means any attacker captures legal network packets from one session and resends them in another session
or at a later time and thereby impersonates himself as a legal user. Usually nonce is used to prevent the replay attack;
however, use of timestamp not only ensures replay attack resilience but preserves the information freshness. In the
ECC‐based consumer registration protocol, nonce n1 is used to prevent replay attack. In addition, in the proposed
ECC‐based mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol, timestamp TS1 is used and sent after encryption
using the secret key PX. After receiving in time T, the publisher initially checks |TS1 − T| < ΔT? If yes, it ensures
no network delay. The publisher also checks received TS1 = decrypted TS1? If yes, it ensures the information freshness
as well as prevents the replay attack. Moreover, in step 3, the consumer receives EPX KPP‖TS1ð Þ which ensures that the
key part KPP is sent by the respective publisher only. As well as, in step 4, when the publisher receives EPX KPC‖TS2ð Þ, it
becomes ensured that the key part KPC is sent by the respective consumer only. Similarly, in the proposed ECC‐based
consumer's password change protocol, the use of timestamp TS3 and encrypted timestamp prevents the replay attack.
Thus, the proposed scheme is free from the replay attack.
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Man‐in‐the middle attack means during communication between two parties an intruder may come in between and
captures the communicating messages, modifies it and sends them for its own benefit. Thus, the intruder sets up secure
communication with both the parties while the two end‐parties believe that they are communicating between them-
selves only. In the proposed ECC‐based mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol, the session key
parts KPP and KPC are communicated between the consumer and the publisher in an encrypted form using secret
key PX which is calculated as: P = PHCT. G = (PX,PY) where PHCT = PWCM + HCT. Here, PWCM is consumer's secret
password and is a secret only between the respective consumer and the publisher. Moreover, HCT is known to and
monitored by the respective consumer and publisher only. Hence, any attacker cannot access PX and thereby unable
to launch a man‐in‐the middle attack.
Similarly, in case of ECC‐based consumer's password change protocol, the sensitive data are communicated between
the consumer and the publisher after encryption using a secret key KX which is calculated as: K = PWCM. G = (KX,KY)
where PWCM is the secret between the respective consumer and the publisher. Hence, the man‐in‐the‐middle attack is
prevented. Thus, the proposed scheme is free from the man‐in‐the‐middle attack.6.5 | Impersonation attack resilience
Impersonation attack is a serious network threat in which an attacker impersonates himself as an authorized/valid
consumer to the publisher or vice versa. In our scheme, initially, the publisher registers a consumer after validating
its public key certificate CACM and provides a password PWCM which is kept secret. Later in the subsequent phases/
protocols, the password is used to authenticate the consumer. The consumer also uses PWCM to calculate the secret
key PX which is used to encrypt all the confidential data for communication. Similarly, the respective publisher also
calculates PX using the same secret password PWCM stored in its database. Since, PWCM is a secret between the
respective consumer and the publisher, nobody else cannot access PWCM and thereby cannot impersonate either
the consumer or the publisher. Hence, the proposed scheme successfully prevents the impersonation attack.6.6 | Perfect forward secrecy
Perfect forward secrecy means even if the long term key becomes known at a point of time, the already negotiated
session key before that time remains secure. In our proposed scheme, even if the consumer's password PWCM is
compromised to an intruder, the secret session key SK remains unknown because SK is calculated in consumer side
as SK = csi. KPP=csi. psi. P = csi. psi. PHCT. G=(SKX, SKY) and in publisher's side as SK = psi. KPC=psi. csi. P = psi. csi.
PHCT. G=(SKX, SKY). Hence SK is not only dependent on PWCM but it depends on two random secrets psi and csi which
cannot be compromised due to the computational problem of ECDLP as described in step 2 and step 3 in subsection
5.2.2. Hence, in the proposed scheme, perfect forward secrecy is maintained.6.7 | Known session key attack resilience
A protocol is vulnerable to known session key attack if the knowledge of the session key in earlier session reveals the
session keys of later sessions. In our scheme the session key SK is calculated as: SK = csi. KPP = psi. KPC where csi and
psi are randomly generated in each session by the consumer and the publisher respectively. As both the session secrets
are changed in each session, knowing one session key does not reveal the other.6.8 | Brute force attack resilience
The proposed scheme is resilient to brute force attack / offline password guessing attack because the adversary has no
way of guessing the secret session key SK since the session key SK is calculated as: SK = csi. KPP = psi. KPC where
KPP = psi. P, KPC = csi. P, P = PHCT. G and PHCT = PWCM + HCT. Here, the contributory key parts KPP and KPC,
two points on elliptic curve, are communicated between each other in an encrypted form and SK is dependent on three
secret numbers psi, csi and PWCM which are randomly generated fromZ
*
p. Since the proposed scheme uses three random
numbers in establishing the shared secret SK and according to,50 it can be concluded that the proposed scheme is well
secured as a shared secret with only one random number is assumed to be compromised. Moreover, SK is a point on the
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polynomial time.7 | FORMAL VERIFICATION AND SIMULATION USING AVISPA
In this section, a formal security analysis of the proposed protocols is done using the well known AVISPA simulator.
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocol and Applications)51-53 is a virtual protocol simulation tool
which detects whether any security protocol is safe or unsafe in a viable network. AVISPA uses HLPSL (High Level Pro-
tocol Specification Language) for simulation of network security protocols. HLPSL is a role based language in which
each active participant involved in a communication protocol is presented as a basic role. Each role is independent from
the other and presents some initial information as parameters which are needed for communication with other role
over.the channel. In AVISPA, the channel is represented as standard Dolev‐Yao (DY) intruder model which means
the intruder has full control over the channel and he/she knows all the public keys and other pre‐negotiated algorithms
like hash operation, encryption/decryption etc. Initially, the protocol written in HLPSL is translated into a lower level
format called Intermediate Format (IF) by a translator called HLPSL2IF. Then the intermediate format of the protocol is
fed into one of the four back‐end modules which are implemented using formal methods and theoretical axioms. The
four back‐end modules of AVISPA are – (1) OFMC – on‐the‐fly Model‐Checker, (2) CL‐AtSe – Constraint Logic based
Attack Searcher, (3) SATMC – SAT‐based Model‐Checker, and (4) TA4SP – Tree Automata‐based Protocol Ana-
lyzer.51-53 All these back‐ends are used to provide protocol falsification and, bounded and unbounded verification.
All the proposed protocols are analyzed using both OFMC and CL‐AtSe AVISPA back‐ends where the output format
of the protocol simulation represents either the safe state or unsafe state.54,55 The formal analysis of each proposed pro-
tocol is beneficial in detecting design flaws which will be very difficult and expensive to detect after the real life deploy-
ment. For each protocol, two basic roles consumer and publisher are presented in HLPSL that are played by C and S
respectively. To ensure secrecy/confidentiality and authentication, HLPSL uses few predicates namely SECRET, WIT-
NESS and REQUEST. The SECRET predicate is used for confidentiality and ensures that the transmitted value is secret
between two concerned parties. The WITNESS and REQUEST predicates are used for authentication where a party
witnessing a variable means that it is sending that variable to the receiver only and its value is fresh, and a party
requesting a variable means that it wants to be assured about the freshness of the variable received and the variable
has been sent by the sender in the live session.
Apart from the basic roles, there are two additional compulsory roles namely session and environment. In the role
session, both the basic roles (consumer and publisher) are instantiated by providing concrete arguments. The role session
also contains composition of basic roles and global constants such as symmetric_key, protocol_id etc. The role environ-
ment, a top‐ level role, contains the security goals of the protocol and the composition of roles where the intruder i acts
as a role of a legitimate user. Mainly it is used to detect the – (1) parallel session attack/replay attack by executing two
sessions between the consumer and the publisher simultaneously, and (2) man‐in‐the‐middle attack by initiating two
sessions between consumer and intruder, and between intruder and publisher.
The simulation of all the proposed protocols is done using SPAN,56 a security protocol animator for AVISPA, and
shows that all are safe. However, due to the space limitation, the roles and simulation results of the proposed ECC‐based
mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol, and ECC‐based consumer's password change protocol are
given in following sub‐sections.7.1 | Simulation result of ECC‐based mutual authentication and session key negotiation
protocol
The two basic roles: consumer and publisher and two additional roles: session and environment for the proposed ECC‐
based mutual authentication and session key negotiation protocol are given in Figure 9. The goal section of role envi-
ronment ensures the secrecy/confidentiality of KPC and KPP which are the key parts, shared by the consumer and the
publisher respectively, to negotiate a shared session key SK. The goal section also ensures mutual authentication
between two parties by ensuring the freshness of TS1 and TS2. The simulation result of the protocol executed in OFMC
back‐end and CL‐AtSe back‐end is given in Figure 10 with the output “safe”.
FIGURE 9 Roles of the authentication phase in AVISPA
ADHIKARI ET AL. 17 of 267.2 | Simulation result of ECC‐based Consumer's password change protocol
The two basic roles: consumer and publisher and two additional roles: session and environment for the proposed ECC‐
based consumer's password change protocol are given in Figure 11. The goal section of role environment ensures the
secrecy/confidentiality of PWCM and PW'CM, and mutual authentication between two parties on the freshness of TS3.
The simulation result of the protocol executed in OFMC back‐end and CL‐AtSe back‐end is given in Figure 12 with
the output “safe”.8 | FORMAL VERIFICATION USING BAN LOGIC
In this section, a formal verification of the proposed protocol is done using the popular BAN logic. BAN logic57 was first
time proposed in 1990 and very soon became a prominent tool for proving the correctness of the authentication proto-
cols. BAN logic is formalized on the many‐sorted model logic and focused on the beliefs of the communicating parties
involved in the authentication protocol. Now, we will discuss the logical notations, postulates used in BAN logic and the
analysis of the proposed authentication protocol in the following subsections.8.1 | BAN logical notations
The usual BAN logical notations are presented in the following Table 2.
FIGURE 10 Protocol simulation results of authentication phase in AVISPA
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BAN logic has many logical postulates but among them only five rules are used in this paper and presented below.
R1: Message Meaning Rule
R1:
P ¼ C↔K
 P; P⊲ Xf gK
P ≡C ∼ Xjj , states that if P believes K is shared between C and P, and P also sees X encrypted by K, then
P believes C once said X.
R2: Freshness Rule
R2:
P ≡j # Xð Þ
P ≡j # X ;Yð Þ, states that if P believes X is fresh then P believes that the entire formula (X, Y) is also fresh.
FIGURE 11 Roles of the password change phase in AVISPA
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R3:
P ≡j # Xð Þ; P ≡j C ∼ Xj
P ≡j C ≡j X , states that if P believes X is fresh and C once said X, then P believes that C believes X.
R4: Decomposition Rule
R4:
P ≡j C ≡j X;Yð Þ
P ≡j C ≡j X , states if P believes that C believes (X, Y), then P believes that C believes X.
R5: Jurisdiction Rule
R5:
P ≡C ≡j X; P ≡jj C ¼ > X
P ≡Xj , states if P believes that C believes X and C has control/jurisdiction over X, then P
believes X.8.3 | Analysis of the proposed authentication protocol using BAN logic
In this model, the consumer and the publisher are considered as the principals C and P respectively. The shared pre‐
secret key between C and P is PX. TS1 and TS2 are the timestamp used in the communication. KPP and KPC are the con-
tributory key parts shared by P and C respectively to negotiate a session key between them. Now, the idealized form of
our protocol according to BAN logic, establishment of security goals, initial assumptions and proof of security goals are
discussed below.
A. Idealized Form
FIGURE 12 Protocol simulation results of password change phase in AVISPA
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M 2: P→C :TS2; TS1;KPPf gPX
M 3: C→P : TS2;KPCf gPXTABLE 2 BAN logical notations and their meanings
Notations Meanings
C, P Principals
C| ≡ X C believes X
C⊲X C sees X
C| ̴ X C once said X
C = > X C controls X
#(X) X is fresh
C↔
K
P K is shared key between C and P
{X}K X is encrypted by K
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G 1: C ∣ ≡ KPP
G 2: P ∣ ≡ KPC
C. Initial Assumptions
A 1: C ∣ ≡ # (TS1)
A 2: P ∣ ≡ # (TS2)
A 3: C ≡C↔
Px
 P
A 4: P ≡C↔
Px
 P
A 5: C ∣ ≡ P = > KPP
A 6: P ∣ ≡ C = > KPC
D. Protocol Analysis
To establish our security goals, we consider the following steps given in step 1 to step 12.
Step 1. Initially, from message M 2, we get statement S 1 as: S1 : C ⊲ {TS1,KPp}px
Step 2. Now, in accordance with initial assumption A 3 and statement S 1, we apply message meaning rule (R1) and
get statement S 2 as: S 2 : C ∣ ≡ P ∣ ~(TS1,KPP).
Step 3. From initial assumption A 1 and message M 2, we apply freshness rule (R2) and get statement S 3 as:
S 3 : C ∣ ≡ # (TS1,KPP).
Step 4. Now, from statement S 2 and S 3, we apply nonce‐verification rule (R3) and get statement S 4 as:
S 4 : C ∣ ≡ P ∣ ≡ (TS1,KPP).
Step 5. On statement S 4, we apply decomposition rule (R4) and get statement S 5 as: S 5 : C ∣ ≡ P ∣ ≡ KPP.
Step 6. Finally, in accordance with our initial assumption A 5 and statement S 5, we apply jurisdiction rule (R5) and
get statement S 6 as: S 6 : C ∣ ≡ KPP (Goal G 1).
Step 7. S7 : P ⊲ {TS2,KPc}px From message M 3, we get statement S 7 as:
Step 8. Now, in accordance with the initial assumption A 4 and statement S 7, we apply message meaning rule (R1) to
get statement S 8 as: S 8 : P ∣ ≡ C ∣ ~(TS2,KPC).
Step 9. From initial assumption A 2 and message M 3, we apply freshness rule (R2) and get statement S 9 as:
S 9 : P ∣ ≡ # (TS2,KPC).
Step 10. Now, from statement S 8 and S 9, we apply nonce‐verification rule (R3) and get statement S 10 as:
S 10 : P ∣ ≡ C ∣ ≡ (TS2,KPC).
Step 11. On S 10, we apply decomposition rule (R4) and get statement S 11 as: S 11 : P ∣ ≡ C ∣ ≡ KPC.
Step 12. In accordance with our initial assumption A 6 and statement S 11, we apply jurisdiction rule (R5) and get
statement S 12 as: S 12 : P ∣ ≡ KPC (Goal G 2).
Hence, through BAN logic, our security goals G 1 and G 2 are established and it is proved that the proposed
proptocol achieves mutual authentication between C and P.9 | PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the performance analysis of the proposed scheme is done in terms of computation and communication
overhead as presented below.9.1 | Computation cost
In the proposed scheme, the ECC is used to design all the communication protocols. It is well established that due to use
of smaller key size (160‐bits) to provide same level of security compared to other public key cryptosystems such as RSA
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curve group, the operation such as scalar point multiplication becomes more efficient and cost effective than the modular
exponentiation operation used inmultiplicative group. As introduced in,58 one‐way hash operation is very fast, time for sym-
metric encryption/decryption is at least 100 times faster than asymmetric encryption/decryption, and time for elliptic curve
point multiplication is much faster than modular exponentiation. For better understanding, the approximate time estima-
tion of different cryptographic operations in milliseconds is considered from Kilinc et al...59 and listed in Table 3. As
discussed in Kilinc et al.,59 the approximate running times of various cryptographic operations are calculated on a PC with
Intel Pentium Dual CPU E2200 2.20GHz processor, 2048 MB of RAM and the Ubuntu 12.04.1 LTS 32bit operating system.
Thus, the computation cost (approximately estimated time in ms) of the proposed ECC‐based mutual authentication
and session key negotiation protocol is compared with other related existing schemes and given in Table 4 which shows
that our scheme has low computation overhead (same as Qi et al.25 and Park et al38) for both the mutual authentication
and negotiation of the session key.9.2 | Communication cost
In the proposed mutual authentication protocol, the consumer's identity IDCM, publisher's identity IDP, timestamps TS1
and TS2, symmetric encryption block size (according to AES algorithm approved by NIST in December, 2001),
ManifestL,ManifestAckP andManifestAckC are assumed to be 128‐bits long. Hence, in the proposed scheme, the total com-
munication cost for the exchange of eight mutual authentication parameters is: 8 × 128 = 1024‐bits. Further, the block
size generated through one‐way hash operation and RSA based modular exponentiation operation used in other related
authentication schemes are assumed to be 128‐bits and 1024‐bits long, respectively. Considering these assumptions, the
comparison of communication cost of the proposed ECC‐based mutual authentication protocol with other related
existing schemes22,25,31-33,38 is given in Table 5 which shows that our scheme has low communication overhead for both
the mutual authentication and negotiation of the session key.
Although Table 4 shows our scheme has same computation overhead as Qi et al.’s25 and Park et al.’s38 schemes,
Table 5 shows our scheme has less communication overhead than Qi et al.’s25 and Park et al.’s38 schemes, and that jus-
tifies the importance of our work.9.3 | Overall efficiency
The security strength and computation and communication overhead analysis are done by inspecting each technique in
detail and thus, a comparative study on overall efficiency between the proposed scheme and other existingTABLE 3 Approximate execution time (in milliseconds) of different cryptographic operations59
Notations Description Approx. Execution time (in ms)
Th Time for one‐way hash operation 0.002
TPM Time for point multiplication 2.226
TE/D Time for symmetric encryption/decryption 0.004
TME Time for modular exponentiation 3.850
TABLE 4 Computation cost comparison of the proposed scheme with other related works22,25,31-33,38
Schemes Mutual authentication and session key negotiation Total time (in ms)
Proposed scheme 6TPM + 6TE/D 13.38
Kalra et al...22 9Th + 8TPM (only for authentication) 17.82
Qi et al.25 6TPM + 10Th 13.38
Chen et al.31 5Th + 3TME + 3TPM 18.23
Jiang et al.32 5Th + 5TME + 1TPM 21.48
Karuppiah et al33 8TME + 2Th 30.80
Park et al.38 12Th + 6TPM 13.38
TABLE 5 Comparison of communication cost of the proposed ECC‐based mutual authentication and session key
negotiation scheme with other related works22,25,31-33,38
Schemes
Communication cost for mutual authentication
(in number of bits)
Kalra et al.22 1280
Qi et al.25 1056
Chen et al.31 1792
Jiang et al.32 1792
Karuppiah et al.33 3968
Park et al.38 1376
Proposed scheme 1024
TABLE 6 Security comparison of the proposed scheme with other related works22,25,31-33,38
Security attributes
Schemes
22 25 31 32 33 38 Our scheme
Mutual authentication No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session key negotiation No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Session key security Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Forward secrecy Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Impersonation attack resilience No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Replay attack resilience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Man‐in‐the‐middle attack resilience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fully operates on insecure channel No No No No No No Yes
Offline password guessing resilience No No No No Yes Yes Yes
ADHIKARI ET AL. 23 of 26schemes22,25,31-33,38 is summarized in Table 6. It can be noted from the above comparisons that the proposed scheme
outperforms the existing schemes in terms of less computation and communication costs with higher security as well
as greater overall efficiency. On the other hand, the proposed scheme can be compatible with the existing IP‐based
network infrastructure by incorporating certain modification in the network layer. The modification may include the
replacement of IP‐based routing with name based routing and incorporation of the network caching mechanism. More-
over, the incremental CCN LAN deployment in the existing IP‐based Internet can be done by using a CCN gateway
node for packet conversion.10 | CONCLUSION
A flexible business model for content centric network with its security measures is proposed in this paper to preserve the
business interests of content publishers/providers that seems to be first time proposed. In this scheme, two different
types of business models namely model‐1 and model‐2 are designed that can be run simultaneously by the publisher
for general and exclusive content provisioning. The security of the models are ensured using ECC‐based protocols in
which consumer registration, mutual authentication, session key negotiation and consumer's password change
provisions are provided. All the proposed protocols are securely operated in insecure channel and are mathematically
analyzed to show the strong resilience against relevant cryptographic attacks. Moreover, all the proposed protocols
are formally verified using well accepted AVISPA simulator and BAN logic and found well secured. Finally, the
performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme is efficient and thus, it preserves the business policy of CCN
in terms of revenue generation.
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